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Abstract
This article examines the perplexing question of why U.S. copyright law allows states to
grant virtually unlimited protection to sound recordings created prior to 1972. Although the
Constitution grants the federal government commanding authority over the United States’
copyright regime, it appears that states are still free to do as they please in at least one important
field. In the 2005 decision of Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc., the New York
Court of Appeals breathed new life into the doctrine of common law copyright by holding that
the rights-holder to a sound recording created any time before the effective date of the Sound
Recording Amendment (February 15, 1972) may exercise exclusive rights over the work under
common law copyright. Prior to that date, federal copyright law protected musical compositions,
but not sound recordings. Because sound recordings were not then copyrightable subject matter
under federal law, states were not barred from granting protection to such works, whether by
common law or statute. At issue in Naxos were a number of sound recordings created in the
1930s in the United Kingdom—a jurisdiction which did provide statutory protection for sound
recordings. Relying upon a few early cases, the Court of Appeals concluded that irrespective of
the expiration of the UK copyrights, New York protects the sound recordings until federal law
preempts the field in 2067.
This seemingly innocuous holding may have serious consequences in destroying an
important piece of our cultural heritage. A handful of large record companies own the rights to
the vast majority of early sound recordings, creating a veritable oligopoly with regard to the
recorded sounds of the first half of the twentieth century. Resultantly, only the most
commercially viable recordings are restored and remastered, while the vast majority of early
works are left to literally crumble to dust. Had these sound recordings been afforded the same
copyright term as other creative works of their age, they would have be released into the public
domain a maximum of 56 years after publication. However, because common law protection
persists, would-be restorers of these early works are barred from taking any action.
This article examines the legal bases for the Naxos decision and concludes that they are
all flawed, both legally and from a policy standpoint. First, the legislative history of the current
Copyright Act strongly suggests that the loophole for allowing state law protection of pre-1972
sound recordings was created by a simple misunderstanding. Furthermore, in reaching its
holding Naxos improperly relied upon a few early cases dealing with common law copyright. As
a matter of policy, not only does Naxos’ expansive view of common law copyright not advance
the purposes of copyright to advance the useful arts and sciences, it threatens the overall
copyright protection scheme and the general public’s interest in preserving its cultural history.
Because of this, Congress should act swiftly to preempt state law protection for pre-1972 sound
recordings by granting them the uniform federal protection enjoyed by other types of intellectual
property.
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Introduction

Common law copyright has long been dismissed as having, at best, marginal significance
in the scheme of U.S. copyright law. Ever since the Copyright Act of 1976 did away with many
of the formalities of registration and notice, common law copyright has largely played a role only
with respect to unpublished works. However, in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc.
(“Naxos”),1 the New York Court of Appeals proved that common law copyright can still play a
substantial role with respect to pre-1972 sound recordings. The court decided that New York
common law continues to protect pre-1972 sound recordings until 2067, regardless of their
publication status. While the decision is thus far limited to New York, other jurisdictions might
be swayed to follow suit.
This article provides a critical account of the United States’ treatment of pre-1972 sound
recordings, and uses the subject litigation as an example of how Congress’s missteps when
enacting the 1972 Sound Recording Amendment 2 and 1976 Copyright Act 3 have led to a
disfavorable result—one that may ultimately result in the loss of many worthy works. Part I of
this article traces the history of protection for sound recordings in the United States and explains
why pre-1972 sound recordings are treated uniquely. Part II details the history of the Naxos
litigation. Finally, Part III argues that Naxos was wrongly decided for both legal and policy
reasons, and exemplifies the need for uniform federal protection for all sound recordings,
including those produced prior to 1972.

1

4 N.Y.3d 540 (N.Y. 2005).
Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (Oct. 15, 1971) [hereinafter SRA].
3
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803 (1976).
2
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I. The History of State Law Protection for Sound Recordings
At the dawn of the Republic, the laws of the several states inherited much of the English
legal tradition, including laws related to the protection of writings. During the period when the
United States government operated under the Articles of Confederation, Congress passed a
resolution recommending that the several states each adopt a copyright law.4 Every state but
Delaware quickly adhered to Congress’s suggestion.5 Then, in 1787, the United States adopted
our Constitution, which gave Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”6 Accordingly, in 1790, Congress passed the first national
copyright law, “An Act for the encouragement of learning,” protecting “maps, charts, and
books.”7 With that, the earlier laws passed by the states were largely preempted except for those
areas not covered by the statute.8 What remained is often referred to as common law copyright.9

4

On May 2, 1783, Congress passed a resolution authored by James Madison which read:
Resolved, that it be recommended to the several States to secure to the authors or publishers of any new
books not hitherto printed . . . the copy right of such books for a certain time not less than fourteen years
from the first publication . . . such copy or exclusive right of printing, publishing, and vending the same, to
be secured to the original authors, or publishers, their executors, administrators, and assigns, by such laws
and under such restrictions as to the several States may seem proper.
Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L. J. 109, 114-15 (1929).
5
See Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive
Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 765-70 (2001).
6
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7
See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
8
The Copyright Act of 1790 contained no express preemption provision, but likely took precedence over state law
under either or both the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of implied conflicts preemption. U.S. CONST. art. VI, §
2; see generally, Tom W. Bell, Misunderestimating Dastar: How the Supreme Court Unwittingly Revolutionized
Copyright Preemption, 5 MD. L. REV. *22 (forthcoming 2005) (discussing the doctrines of preemption).
9
Common law copyright is more accurately referred to as state law protection, as states are free to provide
protection for creative works in any area not subject to federal preemption. 1-2 Melville B. Nimmer & David
Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.02 at 2-18 (2005) [hereinafter “NIMMER”]. Some states afford protection not
via common law, but by statute. For instance, California’s Civil Code provides with respect to pre-1972 sound
recordings:
The author of an original work of authorship consisting of a sound recording initially fixed prior to
February 15, 1972, has an exclusive ownership therein until February 15, 2047, as against all persons
except one who independently makes or duplicates another sound recording that does not directly or
indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in such prior sound recording, but consists entirely of an
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A. The Age of Sound Recordings
In the context of history, mankind has only very recently attained the ability to record
audible sounds onto a medium for subsequent playback. 10 At the turn of the 20th Century,
phonorecords were still a cutting-edge technology and, as is often the case, technology outpaced
the advancement of the law. Courts dealing with creations such as the player piano were illequipped to grant protection due to the antiquated language of the 1790 Act, which was limited
to “writings.”11 The pivotal moment came when the Supreme Court reject the notion that player
piano rolls were “copies” for purposes of the copyright protection. 12

Alarmed by this

development, Congress quickly rewrote the copyright law to ensure that composers would have
the exclusive right to make mechanical reproductions of their music.13 However, the Copyright
Act of 1909 did not provide for any statutory rights to the sound recordings themselves. In fact,
it was not until the 1970s that Congress acted to create federal protections for sound recordings.14
By 1969, the record piracy situation was getting out of hand, and even though Congress
realized that the entire Copyright regime was due for an overhaul, the exigent circumstances
independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate the sounds contained in
the prior sound recording.
Cal. Civ. Code § 980(a)(2) (West 2005). Note that the 2047 date represents the pre-Copyright Term Extension Act
federal preemption date, and has yet to be amended to 2067 in the California statute. See infra note 52 and
accompanying text.
10
Thomas Edison is credited with inventing phonorecords in 1877, but such devices did not become commercially
viable until the 1890s. See Jeffrey A. Abrahamson, Tuning Up For A New Musical Age: Sound Recording
Copyright Protection In A Digital Environment, 25 AIPLA Q. J. 181, 188 (1977).
11
The subject matter of copyright had been progressively expanded since the 1790 Act, but had not reached sound
recordings. See supra Part I.
12
See White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
13
See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909). The 1909 Act introduced the concept of the
compulsory license, providing that “whenever the owner of a musical copyright has used or permitted or . . .
knowingly acquiesced in the use of the copyrighted work, any other person may make similar use of the copyrighted
work, upon payment to the copyright proprietor of a royalty of 2 cents on each such part manufactured, to be paid by
the manufacturer thereof . . . .” Id.
14
See SRA, supra note 2. The lapse of over 62 years between the 1909 Act and 1971 Sound Recording Amendment
(“SRA”) before federal protection was offered to sound recordings is rather odd, given that record piracy had long
been recognized as a serious problem. See e.g. Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Armstrong, 132 F. 711 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1904); Fonotipia, Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951 (C.C. E.D.N.Y. 1909); Mainstream Press, Early American Record
Piracy (1899-1922), available at http://www.mainspringpress.com/pirates.html (last accessed Dec. 3, 2005).
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warranted an immediate fix with respect to sound recordings. As the House Report on the Sound
Recording Amendment (“SRA”) found:
While it is difficult to establish the exact volume or dollar value of current piracy activity,
it is estimated by reliable trade sources that the annual volume of such piracy is now in
excess of $100 million. It has been estimated that legitimate prerecorded tape sales have
an annual value of approximately $400 million.15
Congress also recognized that such piracy harms not only legitimate record manufacturers, but
also musicians and performing artists, in the form of lost royalties, as well as the government, in
the form of lost tax revenues.16
The House Report lamented that the then-current state of legal protection to sound
recordings was inadequate, on both a federal and state level: “If the unauthorized producers pay
the statutory mechanical royalty required by the Copyright Act for the use of copyrighted music
there is no Federal remedy currently available to combat the unauthorized reproduction of the
recording.”17 The Report further recognized that although eight states had enacted record piracy
statutes, “in other jurisdictions the only remedy available to the legitimate producers is to seek
relief in State courts on the theory of unfair competition.”18 Interestingly, while noting the
existence of the state record piracy statutes, the Report was silent on non-statutory state law
protection of sound recordings.19 Regardless, the House felt that the clear absence of federal
protection, along with the limited recourseavailableunder state law , was insufficient because

15

H.R. Rep. No. 92-487 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567 [hereinafter “SRA Report” with page
numbers referencing U.S.C.C.A.N.].
16
Id.
17
SRA Report, supra note 15, at 1567. Notwithstanding this view, some courts have expressly held that the 1909
Act prohibited the duplication of sound recordings produced by the underlying musical compositions’ copyright
owners, even where compulsory license fees were paid. See infra Part III.B.2.
18
SRA Report, supra note 15, at 1567.
19
The 1909 Act appeared to leave open the possibility of such protection. See Copyright Act of 1909, supra note
13, at § 2 (stating that the Act “shall [not] be construed to annul or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an
unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work
without his consent, or to obtain damages therefore”).
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even where plaintiffs prevailed, the remedies available were limited.20 The House also feared
that the copyright clause of the Constitution preempted state protection of sound recordings.21
Of course, this fear was cast aside by the Supreme Court’s decision in Goldstein v. California,
which generally held that state laws granting copyright protection in areas outside the scope of
federal protection were not ipso facto preempted by the Constitution.22
A further motivation for the passage of the SRA was the upcoming international
convention on the topic of record piracy.23 Specifically, Congress wanted to harmonize U.S. law
with the global trend of stronger protection for sound recordings ahead of this convention. The
SRA was urgently needed, as the signing of the convention was due to take place less than a
month after the passage of the bill. 24 Congress recognized that “[o]bviously, progress in
domestic efforts to protect sound recordings will be helpful to the United States Delegation.”25
Indeed, the Geneva Phonograms Convention itself was a speedily-enacted (by international
standards), “special” convention resulting from the widespread recognition that international
record piracy was becoming rampant, not to mention expensive. 26 Thus spurred by the
international community, Congress finally acted to provide federal protection for sound
recordings.

20

Id.
Id.
22
Goldstein v. California., 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973).
23
The Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of their
Phonograms, Oct. 28, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309.
24
See SRA Report, supra note 15, at 1568.
25
Id.
26
As explained in the WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook:
The total value of pirated sound recordings sold worldwide has been increasing steadily. This made it
necessary, even in the early seventies, to establish a special convention without delay. The subject was
raised in May 1970 in the Preparatory Committee for the revision of the two major copyright conventions,
and the new Convention was signed in Geneva after less than 18 months.
WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use, WIPO Publication No.489 (E), Ch. 5, ¶ 5.527,
available at: http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/iprm/pdf/ch5.pdf#brussels_phonograms (last accessed Dec 3, 2005).
21
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B. The Problem of Retroactivity
Nonetheless, at this critical juncture, Congress chose to make the SRA only prospective
in application.27 The 1972 Sound Recordings Amendment is unambiguous in excluding federal
protection from sound recordings produced prior to February 15, 1972. 28 In so deciding,
Congress admitted leaving open “at least one ambiguity” by leaving such works at the mercy of
state law protection.29
This was a strange result, given the acknowledged purposes of protecting sound
recordings from piracy. By definition, prospective application of the new law would mean that
all sound recordings then in existence would not benefit from this new federal protection. This
was especially odd given Congress’s acknowledgment of the inadequacies of state law in
protecting against piracy. Congress attempted to justify this treatment by hinting at possible
criminal prosecution, even while acknowledging that the lack of retroactivity may thwart such
action.30
Four years later, when the Copyright Act was completely amended, 31 Congress
maintained the prospective-only language of the SRA, even though it was quite possible to
provide retroactive protection to pre-1972 sound recordings.

Indeed, Congress had not

theretofore been shy about retroactively creating and enlarging rights for authors and inventors.
In the realm of copyright, there has been “an unbroken congressional practice of granting to
27

“[The Amendment] should not be construed as affecting in any way any rights with respect to sound recordings
fixed before the date of enactment. It thus does not deal with recorded performances already in existence.” SRA
Report, supra note 15 at 1578.
28
“This Act shall take effect four months after its enactment . . . [and] nothing in title 17, United States Code, as
amended by section 1 of this Act, shall be applied retroactively or be construed as affecting in any way any rights
with respect to sound recordings fixed before the effective date of this Act.” Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 at § 3.
29
“Instead [the SRA] leaves to pending or future litigation the validity of state common law or statutes governing
the unauthorized copying of existing recordings. The result of making this copyright authority prospective only is to
create at least one ambiguity.” SRA Report, supra note 15, at 1578.
30
Id.
31
Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2572 (1976).
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authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of term extensions so that all under
copyright protection will be governed evenhandedly under the same regime.”32 Ever since the
passage of the 1790 Act, Congress has regularly applied duration extensions to both existing and
future copyrights.33 Federal patent protection, which shares the same constitutional grounding,
has enjoyed similar extensions without protest.34
Some may argue that retrospective term extensions differ materially from the
retrospective inclusion of an entire category of works (sound recordings).

By replacing

potentially perpetual state law protection for sound recordings with limited-in-time federal
protection, Congress would certainly be modifying the rights of the copyright holder. However,
the drawback of the temporal limitation would be at least partially offset by the benefit of
uniform and predictable protection, as is currently enjoyed by post-1972 sound recordings. In
any event, such a move would not be without precedent - indeed, the 1790 Act itself replaced the
various state copyright laws then in effect, as well as the (admittedly undeveloped) common law
protection of Delaware, which did not pass copyright legislation.35
Why did Congress then balk at this opportunity? One possible theory is that it was an
accident.36 The exclusion of pre-1972 sound recordings from federal statutory protection may
have occurred as a result of the Department of Justice’s mistaken understanding of the copyright
revision bill being deliberated by the 94th Congress. 37 Professor Nimmer reveals that at the
time, the Department of Justice feared that federal preemption of state record piracy statutes
32

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003).
See 1831 Act §§ 1, 16; 1909 Act §§ 23-24; 1976 Act §§ 302-303; 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304.
34
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 202 (“I never have entertained any doubt of the constitutional authority of congress” to
enact a 14-year patent extension that “operates retrospectively.”) (quoting Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F.Cas. 648, 650
(C.C. Mass. 1839) (Story, J.); see also McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 206 (1843) (although laws governing a
patent “may be retrospective in their operation, that is not a sound objection to their validity.”).
35
See Bell, supra note 5, at 765.
36
See 1-2 NIMMER § 2.10.
37
Id.
33
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protecting pre-1972 sound recordings would have rendered such recordings unprotected and led
to an “immediate resurgence of piracy.”38 This fear was based on the mistaken belief that the
then-current version of the bill did not convey federal protection of pre-1972 recordings; it did.39
Nonetheless, as a result of this unfounded fear, before sending the bill over to the House of
Representatives, the Senate committee amended the bill to provide that state protection for pre1972 sound recordings would not be preempted.40 In light of this change, the House committee
recognized that state law would continue to protect pre-1972 sound recordings and federal
protection would thus be obviated. 41 Accordingly, the House committee added another code
section to eliminate federal protection for such works. 42 Thus, if this theory is true, the
Department of Justice’s mistaken belief that the 1976 Act would not protect pre-1972 sound
recordings led to that very result! Because Congress failed to afford federal copyright protection
to pre-1972 sound recordings, it opened the door to potential incongruity in state law protection
of such works, which each state may or may not offer via record piracy statutes or common law.
Another possible explanation for not granting protection retrospectively is tradition.
Specifically, each time the Copyright Act has been amended to include new forms of
copyrightable subject matter, Congress has taken care not to reach back in time to protect works
already in existence.43 For instance, the 1790 Act only protected maps, charts, and books. In
1802, Congress extended protection to any person “who shall invent and design, engrave, etch or
work . . . any historical or other print or prints . . . ,” but only “from and after the first day of

38

Id.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Act of May 31, 1790, c. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
39
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January next.” 44 Similarly, revisions to include musical compositions in 1831, 45 in dramatic
works in 1856,46 and photographs and negatives in 186547 applied only to those works created
after the date of passage of the Act.
However, other subsequent expansions of the scope of federal copyright protection have
been more ambiguous as to their retroactivity.

For instance, an 1870 amendment which

consolidated the copyright laws and expanded copyrightable works to include paintings,
drawings, chromolithographs, statues, statuaries, and models or designs of fine art, makes no
mention of whether it protects these types of works created prior to enactment.48 In addition,
with respect to the 1909 Act, the only amendment other than the SRA was a 1912 amendment to
expressly include motion pictures within the ambit of federal copyright protection. 49 This
amendment also made no mention of retroactive applicability. These latter two instances may
indicate a reversal, or at least weakening of the practice of providing prospective-only protection.
The problem of uniformity has long been recognized as central to the rationale behind
Article I, Section 8. As James Madison stated in Federalist 43, “The States cannot separately
make effectual provision for either [patents or copyrights], and most of them have anticipated the
decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress.” 50

Indeed, Madison

recognized that although a state may regulate and enforce copyrights within its borders, a
potential infringer may simply conduct the infringing activities of copying and distribution

44

Act of Apr. 29, 1802, c. 36, 2 Stat. 171.
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, c. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
46
Act of Aug. 15, 1856, c. 169, 11 Stat. 138.
47
Act of Mar. 3, 1865, c. 126, 13 Stat. 540.
48
Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198.
49
Act of Aug. 24, 1912, c. 356, 37 Stat. 488,
50
The Federalist No. 43 at 270-271 (Rossiter ed. 1961).
45
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outside of its borders in a state that has more lenient laws or weaker enforcement. A state could
do little to adequately police its borders against the importation of such illegal goods.51
Regardless, as it stood in 1978 (and still stands), a loophole was left open in that any pre1972 sound recording enjoyed some variety of state law protection until 2067, the post-CTEA
date of federal pre-emption. 52 For better or worse, this is how the law currently stands for
purposes of examining the subject litigation.
Perhaps the best policy reason for retroactive application , which still rings true today, is
one articulated by Congress itself in passing the SRA: “Copyright protection is narrowly defined
and limited in duration, whereas state remedies, whose validity is still in doubt, frequently create
broad and unwarranted perpetual monopolies.”53

51

See Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973) (“The interests of a State which grants copyright protection may . . . be
adversely affected by other States that do not; individuals who wish to purchase a copy of a work protected in their
own State will be able to buy unauthorized copies in other States where no protection exists.”). The Goldstein court
recognized that although this phenomenon significantly reduced the value of state law protection, such protection
still had economic value, and likened it to other state monopolies, such as lotteries or food concessions at fairs. Id.
In overruling the argument that a state statute purporting to grant perpetual copyright protection to sound recordings
is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court noted that “any tendency to inhibit further progress in science or the arts is
narrowly circumscribed” due to its limitation to that particular state. Id. at 560-561. Query whether the Court
would have come to the same conclusion if a substantial minority of states adopted similar statutes.
52
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, § 102(b) and (d), 112 Stat. 2827-2828 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§
302, 304).
53
SRA Report, supra note 15, at 1368.
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II. Procedural Background of the Naxos Litigation
The Naxos litigation arosefrom a dispute over several classical music recordings created
in the 1930s in England.54 The performing artists’ contracts divested all of their rights in the
works to a company now known as EMI Records, Inc. (“EMI”),55 the parent company of New
York-based Capitol Records, Inc. (“Capitol”). EMI’s statutory copyrights in the recordings of
the performances had all expired prior to 1990, as the law of the United Kingdom granted a 50year copyright term to such works.56 In 1996, an EMI subsidiary57 ostensibly granted Capitol an
exclusive license to exploit the recordings in the United States.58 Capitol subsequently digitally
remastered the recordings and placed them for sale in CD format in the United States.
Sometime shortly thereafter, Naxos, a Hong Kong-based record label specializing in
restoring old classical recordings, borrowed mint copies of the same sound recordings from the
Yale University Library. 59 Without authorization or license from Capitol, Naxos remastered
these old shellac recordings60 and began selling them in 1999, often in direct competition with

54

The sound recordings in question were of live performances of violinist Yehudi Menuhin, cellist Pablo Casals,
and pianist Edwin Fischer. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 204, 206-207
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). All performances and recordings took place between 1932 and 1939. Id.
55
When the recordings took place, EMI was known as Gramophone Company Limited. Id. at 207.
56
See U.K. Copyright Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 46, § 19.
57
At the time of transfer, EMI Records, Inc. was known as EMI Music International Services Ltd. Naxos, 262 F.
Supp. 2d at 208.
58
Id.
59
See Norman Lebrecht, “Whose Music Is It Anyways?”, The Lebrecht Weekly at La Scena Musicale (April 13,
2005), available at http://www.scena.org/columns/lebrecht/050413-NL-historical.html (last accessed Dec. 3, 2005)
(criticizing Naxos: “Pity the poor judges. Hardly a month passes without someone in a black gown having to lay
down the law on matters so fluid they might be more fittingly served in a saloon bar”).
60
As described by Naxos on its website, the process of restoration involves a multi-step process, including cleaning
the records with special materials, carefully centering them on a heavy-duty turntable, checking for correct rotational
speed, and adjusting for variations in pitch and selecting a stylus width that reproduces the most sound with the least
surface noise. See “Naxos Historical,” at http://www.naxos.com/mainsite/default.asp?label=NaxosHistorical (last
accessed Dec. 3, 2005). Numerous transfers are often made of each disc to capture the finest plays, as sometimes
one or other side of the groove may produce the better sound, depending on the particular vintage of the recording.
Id. Further, the engineer applies his discretion in using equalizers to produce sound that is more loyal to what he
believes to be closer to that of the original performance. Id. Finally, the engineer uses various digital noise
reduction systems to remove many of the clicks, pops, and crackles present in many old recordings. Id.
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Capitol’s CDs.61 On Christmas Eve 2002, Capitol brought suit against Naxos of America, Inc.,
the Tennessee headquartered subsidiary of Naxos, in the Southern District of New York sitting in
diversity. 62

Capitol alleged unfair competition, misappropriation, unjust enrichment, and

common law copyright infringement, seeking injunctive relief, actual damages, and punitive
damages in excess of twenty million dollars.63
District Judge Robert Sweet granted summary judgment to Naxos,64 holding that when
the U.K. copyrights to the recordings expired, EMI (and thus Capitol) had lost its intellectual
property rights to the original recordings.65 The district court characterized Capitol’s cause of
action as a “hybrid copyright, unfair competition” claim, and held that Capitol failed to prove a
prima facie case for such cause of action.66
Capitol appealed to the Second Circuit, which found that the case raised unsettled issues
under New York state law.67 Thus, the Second Circuit certified three questions to New York’s
highest court, asking (1) whether the expiration of the term of a copyright in the country of origin
terminate a common law copyright in New York,68 (2) whether a cause of action for common
law copyright infringement includes some or all of the elements of unfair competition,69 and (3)
whether a claim of common law copyright infringement is defeated by a defendant’s showing
61
See Brian Wise, Budget CDs: The Salvation of the Classical Recording Industry?, ANDANTE, 2001, available at:
http://www.andante.com/article/article.cfm?id=14167 (last accessed Dec. 3, 2005) (“Whereas the average new
classical recording currently sells for around $18 in the U.S., . . . the suggested retail price[] for Naxos discs . . . [is]
$6.99 . . . .”).
62
Naxos, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
63
See Plaintiff’s Amended Compl., 2003 WL 23724639.
64
Naxos originally moved to dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Capitol cross-moved for summary judgment under Rule 56. Naxos, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 206. Finding the record
sufficiently developed, the trial judge converted the motion to dismiss to a cross motion for summary judgment. Id.
at 207.
65
Any right not divested upon expiration of statutory copyright was subsequently waived or abandoned. Id. at 211.
66
Id. at 210.
67
Naxos, 372 F.3d at 474.
68
4 N.Y.3d at 561-63.
69
Id. at 563-64.
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that the plaintiff’s work has slight, if any, current market and that the defendant’s work, although
using components of the plaintiff’s work, is fairly to be regarded as a “new product.”70
In a unanimous opinion authored by Judge Victoria Graffeo, the New York Court of
Appeals answered “no” to all three questions, ruling against Naxos on all three certified
questions.71 In reaching these decisions, the court found that the public sale of a sound recording
otherwise unprotected by statutory copyright does not constitute a publication sufficient to divest
the owner of common law copyright protection.72 While Naxos initially indicated that it planned
to apply for certiorari to the Supreme Court,73 no such action has been taken.

70

Id.
Id.
72
Id.
73
See Mark Berry, “Naxos Responds to New York Court Ruling,” CLASSICAL WORLD NEWS (April 12, 2005),
available at http://www.classicstoday.com/Classics/ASPFiles/ViewNewsFeed.asp?Action=User&ID=194 (last
accessed Dec. 3, 2005).
71
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III. A Critique of Naxos
In construing state law protection for pre-1972 sound recordings in the broadest possible
manner, the New York Court of Appeals erred from both a policy standpoint as well as a matter
of law. In answering all three certified questions in the negative, the New York Court of
Appeals embarked on a misguided journey through the history of common law copyright,
leading to a result inconsistent with previous judicial determinations of the scope of state law
protection to pre-1972 sound recordings. Furthermore, the result fails to advance the policy
rationale behind granting such protection.
A. Questionable Law
1. Common law Copyright and Related Doctrines With Respect to Published Sound Recordings
The New York Court of Appeals ultimately found that common law copyright still
protected Capitol’s septuagenarian records, regardless of the expiration of the rights in the
United Kingdom.74 But just what is “common law copyright” protection with regard to widely published sound recordings? Previous cases, including those cited by the court’s analysis, have
only once reached the conclusion that published sound recordings receive common law copyright
protection.75

74

4 NY.3d at 562-63.
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955). That case may be wrongly
decided. See infra at Part I.A.2. But see Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976)
(involving common law copyright protection of unpublished sound recordings); Radio Corp. of America v. Premier
Albums, Inc., 19 A.D.2d 62, 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (implicitly adopting an unfair competition analysis with
respect to sound recordings); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 672 F.2d 1095, 1105-1106 (2d Cir.
1982) (dealing with common law copyrights in unpublished film clips), cert denied 459 U.S. 826 (1982); G. Ricordi
& Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914, 916 (2d Cir. 1952) (unfair competition claim with respect to a book); Capitol
Records Inc. v. Wings Digital Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d 280, 286 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (involving federal copyright
infringement and state unfair competition, misappropriation, and unfair trade practices laws with respect to sound
recordings); Metropolitan Opera, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 489 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) (involving common law unfair
competition with respect to sound recordings).
75
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Common law copyright was traditionally applied with respect to literary works such as
books, manuscripts, etc.76 Under the 1909 Act, such literary works were protected under federal
statutory protection upon publication, which signified the dividing line between state and federal
law protection.77 Thus, common law copyright with respect to such works was limited to the
author’s right of first publication.78 Once the author released the product into the world; either
by public performance or display, selling it on the market at whatever price it might bear, or
otherwise distributing the work; the common law copyright was lost.79 However, if the work
was properly registered and noticed in accordance with the 1909 Act, the author would then
receive federal statutory rights in the work.80
Sound recordings, of course, did not receive statutory protection under the 1909 Act.81
Once published, federal law provided no comfort to the artists or their assignees. What happens,
then, once a pre-1972 sound recording is published? In Naxos, the New York Court of Appeals
answered that the result is continuing state law protection, essentially holding that the protection
for pre-1972 sound recordings would be as expansive as federal copyright, without the same
temporal limitations. 82 The court further decided that a successful claim for common law

76

See Chamberlain v Feldman, 300 NY 135, 89 N.E.2d 863 (N.Y. 1949) (enjoining publication of Mark Twain
manuscript under “common law copyright” on behalf of his estate's trustees in the absence of any indication of fraud
or bad faith); Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 345 (N.Y. 1968) (discussing the same).
77
Estate of Hemingway, 23 N.Y.2d at 345-46 n.1 (“Common law copyright is the term applied to an author's
proprietary interest in his literary or artistic creations before they have been made generally available to the public.
It enables the author to exercise control over the first publication of his work or to prevent publication entirely hence, its other name, the ‘right of first publication’ . . . it is extinguished immediately upon publication of the work
by the author. He must then rely, for his protection, upon Federal statutory copyright.”)
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Mercury Records, 221 F.2d at 661.
82
4 N.Y.3d at 563-64; see also Mercury Records, 221, F.2d at 667 (Learned Hand, J., dissenting) (“States are not
free to follow their own notions as to when an author’s right shall be unlimited both in user and in duration.”).
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copyright infringement need not include any elements of unfair competition, i.e. bad faith, fraud,
or deception of the public.83
This is a novel expansion of common law copyright in New York. Up until the Naxos
decision, New York courts had traditionally addressed infringement of common law-protected
sound recordings under the aegis of unfair competition and/or misappropriation.84 Under the
Naxos court’s holding, at least with respect to published pre-1972 sound recordings, a plaintiff
can prevail in a suit for common law copyright infringement simply by showing that he was the
creator or successor in interest and that defendant had made unauthorized use of the sound
recording at issue. Unfair competition and misappropriation become almost unnecessary for the
rights holders of such recordings, as the added burden of proving bad faith or other deceitful
conduct with respect to published sound recordings make them far less attractive as causes of
action.85
Rather than go this route, the court just as easily could have required the inclusion of the
elements of misappropriation or unfair competition as part of a cause of action for common law
copyright infringement of pre-1972 sound recordings. This may be a better compromise between
protecting rights holders against those competitors who would “compete unfairly” by making
copies of the records and selling them in competition, or by passing them off as originals. Such a
result would better balance the interests of protecting the rights-owner of the intellectual property
with copyright’s goal of spurring innovation and competition.86

83

4 N.Y.3d at 563; Id. at 563 n.10.
See supra note 63.
85
Of course, the plaintiff could plead these causes of action, which may have different statutes of limitations, in
order to obtain additional damages. See Roy Export Co., supra note 75.
86
See infra note 111.
84
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One might argue that such a construction of common law copyright would put the rightsholder of a sound recording at a disadvantage vis-à-vis rights-holders of other copyrightable
works. However, this is merely indicative of the fundamental nature of a sound recording - a
repository of sounds, which involves editing, tuning, design, and perhaps remastering, is
fundamentally attached to some external source, whether it be a composer, mother nature, etc.
So long as creative works are not misappropriated by a competitor, there is little harm in
allowing similar works go to market. Indeed, the 1976 Act recognizes, at a minimum, that sound
recordings should not be afforded the same protections as some of the more venerable subjects of
copyright protection. For instance, owners of copyrights in sound recordings do not have an
exclusive right to public performances.87 It would not be so unnatural, then, to place a slight
additional limitation on pre-1972 sound recordings by requiring that their rights holders show
some element of unfair use in order to recover. “[A] man’s property is limited to the chattels
which embody his invention,” and “others may imitate these at their pleasure” and even resell
them as their own.88
With respect to the subject litigation, Capitol’s claims would have failed under an unfair
competition analysis. Naxos at no time attempted to pass its CDs off as Capitol’s.89 Thus,
Capitol’s claims could only survive if the Court of Appeals may have fundamentally erred by
finding that common law copyright can exist without the bad faith and deceptive elements of
unfair competition.
87

17 U.S.C. § 106.
262 F. Supp. 2d at 213 (quoting Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Indus., Inc., 16 A.D.2d 420, 522 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1962).
89
See e.g. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 531 (“‘Unfair competition,’ as known to the
common law, is a limited concept. Primarily, and strictly, it relates to the palming off of one's goods as those of a
rival trader . . . .”) (emphasis added); Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27 n.1 (“Passing off . . . occurs when a producer
misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else’s.). Similarly, Naxos’ activities would not constitute
reverse passing off, as it did not make copies of Capitol’s CDs and market them as its own; it remastered the original
recordings into its own, distinctive product. Id.
88
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2. Common Law Copyright in Sound Recordings Cannot Be Divested
In reaching its final decision, the New York Court of Appeals held that publication does
not divest a sound recording of protection under New York common law.90 In support of this
finding, the court reviewed the case law dating back over a half century.91 The court specifically
relied on another case prosecuted by the plaintiff over fifty years ago, Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Mercury Records Corp. In Mercury, the Second Circuit held that the public sale of records does
not constitute a divestive publication that deprived the owner of the exclusive rights to distribute
such records.92
In reaching its decision, the court in Mercury Records examined an even earlier decision,
Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.,93 which enjoined the
copying of live performances as unfair competition by holding that prior public performance
does not deprive the rights-holder of common law rights.94 Over a vigorous dissent by Judge
Learned Hand, the Mercury Records court held that if such live copying was prohibited, it would
be a “capricious” distinction to allow the subsequent copying of records of live performances,
which would be the result if publication constituted divestment of common law protection. This
holding overruled R.C.A. Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman,95 which held that subsequent copying
of published records would not be enjoined by common law.96

90

The court alludes in a footnote that “Capitol has a protected property interest in the performances embodied on the
shellac records.” 4 N.Y. at 564 n. 11 (citing Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 880
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (relying on composite protection under unfair competition, common law copyright and
unlawful interference with contract).
91
See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F. 2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
92
Id.
93
279 A.D. 632 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951).
94
Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 493-94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950).
95
114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
96
RCA was incidentally also authored by Learned Hand 15 years earlier. See also 1-4 NIMMER § 4.06 [B].
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The Mercury Records decision is questionable on several grounds. First, the operas at
issue in Metropolitan Opera were protected under federal copyright as musical works
independent of their status as sound recordings. Thus, the sale of records would not constitute a
forfeiture of the copyright to the musical works.97 Specifically, operas themselves are creative
and original works of authorship that enjoyed federal copyright protection under the 1909 Act,
and it was unnecessary to find infringement of the sound recordings. The unauthorized copying
of the broadcasts of the Opera would constitute copyright infringement of the underlying works.
In such a case, there is no “capricious” distinction to be had.
Further, Metropolitan Opera featured co-plaintiffs: the Opera (performer) and Columbia
Records (holder of exclusive right to record performances). 98 A contract between the coplaintiffs granted Columbia the exclusive right to record the Opera’s performances. The court
held that plaintiff Columbia Records could recover because “the right of [the co-plaintiffs] to
protect their interest in the [contract] against interference by the intentional acts of [WagnerNichols, defendant] is not limited by the analogies of common law property rights.”99 In other
words, Metropolitan Opera and Columbia had a right to recover for tortious interference with
their contractual arrangement.

Because of this, it can be argued that Metropolitan Opera

recognized perfectly the “capricious” distinction between copying of the live performances and
the records of such live performances. Viewed in this light, the Metropolitan Opera court may

97

This situation differs from that of Naxos, which involves the sound recordings of performances of public domain
musical works.
98
Metropolitan Opera Ass’n, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
99
Id. at 797.
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have been content with such a distinction, preferring instead that contract law protect the
interests of the litigants in similar situations.100
B. Unquestionably Bad Policy
While the legal merits are doubtful, the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Naxos is
strikingly misguided from a policy standpoint.

Although allowing states to protect sound

recordings where federal protection is absent makes sense as a general matter, here, the facts do
not justify protection. Specifically, the traditional policy rationales behind copyright do not
support Naxos’ expansive view of state law protection.

Furthermore, allowing states to

“discover” state law protection in these kinds of cases frustrates Congress’s delicate balance
between the rights of the composer’s with those of the public.
1. NaxosCreates an Uneconomical Choice
Under the holding of Naxos, major record labels now enjoy a veritably unlimited
monopoly over any economically valuable pre-1972 sound recording. Early sound recordings
were expensive and difficult to create, and hence the predecessors of today’s major record labels
owned the rights to virtually all of them.101 Even as to sound recordings with a vague copyright
lineage, the possibility of state law protection dissuades would- be restorers or republishers from
investing in restoration, as doing so may expose them to legal liability in light of the Naxos
decision.

100

This problem is even more serious given the fact that so many of these early

Cf. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 252 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (holding that a
hybrid of unfair competition, common law copyright, and intentional interference with contract protects the sound
recordings).
101
Early restrictions on shellac, the raw material needed to make early records, was hard to come by, and thus the
major record companies made the vast majority of commercial recordings. See Donald Clarke, THE RISE AND FALL
OF POPULAR MUSIC ch. 11 (St. Martin’s Press 1995).
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recordings are stored on deteriorating media. 102 Barring another extension, pre-1972 sound
recordings will only enter the public domain in the year 2067. By then, a great number of these
recordings may have deteriorated to the point of being lost in history forever. Thus, the scope of
state copyright protection envisioned by the New York Court of Appeals may result in a tragic
loss of a great portion of early twentieth-century musical culture.103
Copyright law is often viewed as a necessary evil to prevent market failure. 104
Examining the circumstances with respect to pre-1972 sound recordings, however, the converse
is more likely to be true: common law copyright is an evil that exacerbates a market failure for
the already difficult-to-access early works. The typical economic incentive justification for
copyright protection simply does not work here. It is difficult to articulate a good faith argument
that the amount paid to the artists in the 1930s was influenced by the record company’s
consideration that it would enjoy near-perpetual common law copyright protection in the US.105
At the time the recordings were created, it was unclear if, and when, common law protection for
sound recordings would end in the United States (and to what extent it afforded protection at all).
Suffice it to say, expecting rights to last until 2067 would have been overly ambitious even for
the record labels who owned them.
Further, the economic rationale for preventing record piracy does not apply to the facts of
Naxos. Unlike record pirates who typically use quick and dirty methods of copying to produce

102

Shellac is an organic material and is subject to both chemical and mechanical damage. See “Care of Sound
Recordings”, National Library of New Zealand, at: http://www.natlib.govt.nz/en/services/2sound.html (last accessed
Dec 3, 2005). Lacquer discs, another form of early recording, are unstable and have a relatively short life. Id.
103
With respect to works that are protected under the Copyright Act, a bill has been introduced to prevent further
losses to our cultural heritage by way of deterioration. See Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2408, 109th
Cong. (2005).
104
See 1-1 NIMMER § 1.03.
105
Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 n.15 (2003) (deferring to Congressional hearings, which seemed to
indicate that the pleas of Bob Dylan, Don Henley, and Carlos Santana were persuasive with respect to the
proposition that extending copyright to ensure that their heirs gave them further incentive to create).
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inferior recordings, Naxos’ CDs were superior to the original shellacs by virtue of the methodical
and high-tech restoration process. 106 Compare this situation with the facts of Metropolitan
Opera, where the court was motivated by concern with the “fostering and encouragement of fine
performances of grand opera, and their preservation and dissemination to wide audiences,”107
and with protecting against the “invasion of the moral standards of the market place.”108 Here, in
contrast with the duplicates in Metropolitan Opera, the Naxos restorations would not discourage,
but rather encourage “the preservation and dissemination” of “fine performances.”
The original shellacs are themselves unmarketable today. As a result, they have no direct
economic value unless someone expends time, skill, and capital to restore them into a
contemporarily marketable format. Naxos should not be punished simply because it was not
among the small handful of record companies that have survived since the early twentieth
century with all the spoils of the early records. But for the strange circumstances which led to
the non-retroactive application of the SRA and 1976 Act with respect to sound recordings,109 this
would not be an issue.
Thus the public interest in ensuring that artists have ample incentive for performance is
not implicated. Naxos did not produce a cheap knock-off of Capitol's recordings that would
undercut and discourage Capitol's investment. 110 Rather, Naxos went into competition with

106

See supra note 60.
101 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
108
Id. at 500.
109
See supra Part I.B.
110
This makes Naxos quite unique from other record piracy cases. See Metropolitan Opera, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 487
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) (stating that “[t]he quality of [the defendants’] recordings is inferior to that of Columbia
Records and is so low that Metropolitan Opera would not have approved the sale and release of such records to the
general public.”); Capitol Records, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 555 (describing a loss of “public good will” “because of the fact
that the product turned out by defendants is inferior to that produced by [plaintiff].”). See also Metropolitan Opera,
101 N.Y.S.2d at 492 (holding that the law of “unfair competition does not rest solely on the ground of direct
competitive injury, but on the broader principle that property rights of commercial value are to be and will be
protected from any form of unfair invasion or infringement and from any form of commercial immorality, and a
court of equity will penetrate and restrain every guise resorted to by the wrongdoer.”); Bond Buyer v. Dealers Digest
107
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Capitol on a level playing field, remastering the original shellacs and creating its own CDs,
which in fact compared favorably to Capitol’s restorations in terms of sound quality.111 This is
precisely the type of competition that copyright was designed to promote, as opposed to the
unfettered monopoly that the New York Court of Appeals granted.112
In fact, on a broader level, it is even possible that Naxos' restorations have revived the
relevant market in historic classical performances to Capitol's benefit.

Thus, the Naxos

restorations help ensure that quality historic performances are commercially available for the
present generation and well-preserved for the next. A February 3, 2002 article in The Chicago
Tribune went so far as to conclude, “The great salvation for classical recording continues to lie
with the smaller independent labels . . . such as . . . Naxos . . . continue to put out records that
justify themselves artistically.”113 Not surprisingly, the RIAA was not enthusiastic about this
competition and promptly filed an amicus brief in support of Capitol.114
2. Naxos Conflicts With Congressional Intent
Further, it seems plausible that Congress, in passing the 1909 Act, had been content with
protecting sound recordings by way of the compulsory licensing regime. This left no provision
for the copyright protection for such recordings, at least with respect to “similar uses” which did
not involve direct copying. Congress purposefully delayed enacting the 1909 Act until after the

Publ'g Co., 267 N.Y.S.2d 944, 945-46 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966); Cf. National Exhibition Co. v. Fass, 143 N.Y.S.2d
767 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Mutual Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941).
111
See 262 F.Supp. 2d at 215. Ironically, common law copyright would do little to prevent a bootlegger from
creating and selling crude knock-off copies of the original shellacs in CD format, as such a person would likely be
judgment-proof. It would also likely be uneconomical for Capitol to pursue claims against such parties in diverse
jurisdictions, having to test the common law of each state in which a defendant resides.
112
See e.g. Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual
Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1488 (2004) (copyright law is intended “to strike a balance that
encourages or promotes competition notwithstanding the grant of exclusive rights.”).
113
John von Rhein, Classical record sales: The first nine months of 1999: 11.1 million, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Feb. 3, 2002, at 1.
114
See Br. for Amicus Curiae Recording Industry Association of America in Supp. of Plaintiff-Appellant Capitol
Records, Inc., 2005 WL 776196 (2005).
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Supreme Court’s decision in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 115 which
expressly held that player piano music rolls were not “copies” within the scope of copyright
protection.116 Thus, with full knowledge of how courts would treat sound recordings, Congress
promulgated the 1909 Act devoid of distinct copyright protections for sound recordings,
choosing instead to entitle the rights-holder of the underlying musical composition a statutory
two cents per copy for “similar use” by others.117
Indeed, commentators have even suggested that under the 1909 Act, a third party could
go as far as to duplicate original works so long as they paid the compulsory license fee. 118
However, this expansive interpretation was rejected by several courts, 119 beginning with the
Ninth Circuit in Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern.120 In Duchess, a divided panel held that “exact
duplication” of a copyrighted musical work did not constitute “similar use” for purposes of the
compulsory license provision of the 1909 Act.121 This led to the rather odd result that copyright

115

H.R. Rep. No. 7083, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 10; pt. 2, at 3-4 (1907).
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908).
117
See 1909 Act, supra note 13. The House Report on the 1909 Act stated that “[i]t is not the intention of the
committee to extend the right of copyright to the mechanical reproductions themselves, but only to give the
composer or copyright proprietor the control, in accordance with the provisions of the bill, of the manufacture and
use of such devices.” H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1909). In Goldstein v. California, the Supreme
Court rejected the argument that this language signaled Congress’s desire to preclude states from granting copyright
protection for sound recordings. 416 U.S. 546 (1973). Instead, the Court interpreted this language as merely
indicative of Congress’s intent to limit the rights of the composer with respect to subsequent renditions and
recordings of her work. Id. at 566.
118
See Melville B. Nimmer, Photocopying and Record Piracy: Of Dred Scott and Alice in Wonderland, 22 UCLA
L. REV. 1052, 1060 (1975) (suggesting that under the 1909 act, a third party could duplicate original works by
paying the compulsory licensing fee under the 1909 Act).
119
See supra note 112.
120
In Duchess, a group of record pirates, after paying the compulsory license fee, had copied and sold identical
reproductions of tape recordings created by the copyright owners of the underlying musical works. Duchess Music
Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972).
121
Id. at 1310; id. at n.5. Accord Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285 (10th
Cir. 1974) (finding that the 1909 Act permitted defendants to “‘use’ the copyright composition in a manner ‘similar’
to that made by the licensed recording company” but did not permit them to “use the composer’s copyrighted work
by duplicating and copying the record of a licensed recording company.”); Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody
Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 1974) (finding that “duplicators or pirates do not ‘use’ the composer’s
work in a ‘similar’ fashion - indeed, they do not utilize the composer’s work at all. It is a recording which is used.
Rather than permit the use of a recording of the composition, the statute only authorizes the use of the copyrighted
116
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owners of musical compositions had a de facto right under federal law to exclude others from
copying recordings of performances of such compositions, even after Congress expressed its
belief that so such right existed and passed an amendment in reliance thereon.122
An undercurrent consisting of the inherent “wrongness” of allowing record piracy and the
1909 Act’s seemingly counterintuitive allowance of such behavior implicitly drove the majority
opinions of Duchess and other courts to construe the Act as prohibiting such.123 Each of these
decisions found guidance in an early case construing the 1909 Act’s supposed prohibition of
copying, Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co.124 In Aeolian, the district court disallowed direct
copying of a perforated piano roll notwithstanding the 1909 Act’s compulsory licensing
provision on the theory that a defendant “cannot avail himself of the skill and labor of the
original manufacturer of the perforated roll or record by copying or duplicating the same, but
must resort to the copyrighted composition or sheet music, and not pirate the work of a
competitor who has made an original perforated roll.”125 Thus, a major policy rationale behind

work, that is, the written score”); Fame Publishing Co. v. Alabama Custom Tape, Inc., 507 F.2d 667, 669 (5th Cir.
1975). But see Stern, 497 F.2d at 1311-13 (Byrne, J., dissenting) (finding more persuasive Professor Nimmer’s view
that direct copying was allowed so long as the compulsory license fee was paid, in light of the legislative history of
the 1909 Act); Marks, 497 F.2d at 291-92 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting) (agreeing with the soon-to-be-reversed district
court’s decision in Jondora); Jondora, 506 F.2d at 397 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Fame, 507 F.2d at 672 (Godbold,
J., dissenting). Not surprisingly, Professor Nimmer is sharply critical of the so-called Duchess doctrine, which
rejected his views on the 1909 Act’s treatment of sound recordings. See generally, 2-8 NIMMER § 8.04[E][1].
122
Namely, the Sound Recording Amendment. See SRA Report, supra note 15. But see Marks, 497 F.2d at 289
(“we are of course not bound by Congress’s interpretation of a prior existing law”) (citing Golsen v. C.I.R., 445 F.2d
985 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971)). Also, Professor Nimmer hypothesizes that the Duchess
doctrine bizarrely might also allow a copyright owner of a musical composition to sue for copyright infringement of
unauthorized reproductions of a third-party’s authorized reproductions. See 2-8 NIMMER § 8.04[E][1]; Aeolian Co.
v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926, 927 (W.D.N.Y. 1912).
123
See 2-8 NIMMER § 8.04[E][1] (“Like the Duchess in Alice in Wonderland, the Duchess majority searched
assiduously, and found their ‘moral,’ based upon the most questionable legal reasoning. As the dissenting judge
observed in Jondora . . . , subsequent courts have followed ‘like the children of Hamelin in their erroneous
piping.’”)
124
196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912).
125
Id. at 927.
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the Duchess doctrine was preventing a copier from profiting from the fruits of the original
recorder’s “skill and labor.”126
With respect to the Naxos litigation, Capitol could not rely upon the Duchess doctrine to
recover against Naxos. Indeed, Capitol did not own the copyright to the underlying musical
works of the subject recordings, as they had long passed into the public domain.127 However, the
arguments against the Duchess doctrine apply a fortiori against the New York Court of Appeals’
allowance of seemingly unlimited state law protection for pre-1972 sound recordings.
Specifically, unlike the defendants in the Duchess line of cases, Naxos did not simply
make copies of Capitol’s 1930s era shellac recordings and sell them.128 Nor was Naxos a fly-bynight business operating clandestinely in a basement - the traditional image of the record
pirate. 129 In contrast, Naxos is an established record label specializing in the restoration of
obscure classical works. The district court found that in remastering the original recordings,
Naxos employed “a value-added process which takes the raw material or the original recording
and uses skill, technology and taste in order to make it into a new and unique product.”130 Thus,
unlike a tape pirate that parasitically relies upon the skill and labor of the original recorder,
Naxos expended a considerable amount of resources in creating an entirely new product. While
Naxos can still be said to have “used” the original recording in creating its CDs, such use was
not the identical copying enjoined by the Duchess line of cases, and looks more like the “similar
use” Congress intended to allow under the 1909 Act.
126

See e.g. Duchess, 458 F.2d at 1310; Marks, 497 F.2d at 289-290. Cf. Jondora, 506 F.2d at 394 n.4 and
accompanying text (acknowledging that Aeolian has been criticized for allowing a plaintiff-licensee-manufacturer
who did not own the musical copyright to sue for an injunction as a “party aggrieved”).
127
Naxos, 540 N.Y. 3d at 544.
128
In any event, it is unlikely that such copies would have any market value, as most people do not own devices
capable of playing shellac recordings.
129
Or a high-tech college student downloading gigabytes of music and movies in his dorm room, to take the more
modern image.
130
262 F. Supp. 2d. at 214.
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Of course, state common law lacks a compulsory licensing scheme like that of the 1909
Act. However, this actually suggests that state law protection of pre-1972 sound recordings is
directly contrary to Congress’s vision of the 1909 Act’s protection for such works.

The

compulsory licensing provision of the Act, which at least allowed unauthorized similar (but nonidentical) uses, existed to balance the rights of the composer with the interest of preventing a
monopoly.131 If states are allowed to grant sound recordings exclusive rights irrespective of the
anti-monopolistic compulsory licensing provision, the congressionally mandated balance is
frustrated.
By way of hypothesis, suppose that at the time of trial, Capitol still owned the copyright
in the underlying musical compositions of the subject recordings. In such a circumstance,
Capitol could not likely enjoin Naxos’ selling of remastered recordings, as Naxos’ use would
likely qualify as a “similar use” allowed by the 1909 Act.132 Why should Capitol enjoy more
rights to the sound recordings because they were of public domain music, rather than of music
which it held a copyright? Allowing states this ability to eliminate competition in the field of
restoration of ancient recordings appears to directly interdict Congress’s intent.

131
132

See e.g. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 569; Duchess, 458 F.2d at 1309; Jondora, 506 F.2d at 393.
Granted, of course, that Naxos would have also paid the statutory licensing fee.
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IV. Conclusion
In sum, Naxos is a bizarre case which highlights the shortcomings of allowing
unrestricted state law protection of pre-1972 sound recordings. In step with the broader trend of
expanding copyright in the U.S., the New York Court of Appeals bent over backwards to
construe the law in a manner that maximizes the term of protection and minimizes competition.
Further, given the facts of this particular case, enjoining Naxos’ commendable work in restoring
obscure yet remarkable early recordings is quite lamentable. Rather than promoting the useful
arts, Naxos threatens to destroy an important piece of our common heritage that is embodied in
such early records.

Congress should take heed of these developments and act to ensure

consistent federal protection of pre-1972 sound recordings.

